This paper was originally prepared for a seminar on the Presidential elections sponsored by the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society at the University of Melbourne on 2 July 2014. Colin would like to thank Dr Greta Nabbs-Keller and Ms Iem Brown for their comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
In
this brief presentation, I want to look at the foreign and defence policies as
articulated by Jokowi and Prabowo. I will look at two primary sources of
information on the candidates: the Vision and Mission Statements (Visi dan Misi) which they submitted to
the KPU in May, and the 3rd televised presidential debate on 22 June
2014.
I
am aware of course that both candidates are politicians, and thus that what is
promised in the election campaign may not turn out to be that they do if
elected to office.
I
am aware too that this is essentially an election about domestic political and
economic issues – or perhaps more accurately, domestic political and economic
leadership – and not foreign policy.
Of
the two candidates, Prabowo is generally held to have the greater international
experience. One commentator notes, he “spent his formative years abroad”.
Between 1958 and 1968, his father was in political exile from Indonesia, living
in various places including Singapore but longest in Europe. And it was
in Europe, one commentator argues, that “Prabowo’s
nationalism grew, as did his admiration for Western ideas”. As a
young army officer, he trained at Fort Benning in the US. And following his
dismissal from the military he spent several years overseas, mostly in Jordan.
He has excellent English. His first major political speech
overseas, delivered in Singapore in 2012, demonstrated this capacity, along
with his ability to ad lib to a foreign audience, albeit one which seems to have
been overwhelmingly positively predisposed towards him.
Jokowi’s
international connections are far less obvious. Indeed, he is often painted as
the candidate with almost no international exposure. This is not entirely
correct. As a furniture exporter, Jokowi travelled
frequently to Singapore from 1991 onwards to exhibit his products. He also
seems to have had considerable experience in dealing with foreign companies
seeking to import his furniture: by the late 1980s, his biography says,
business with Europe was booming. As Jakarta governor, he hosted an ASEAN
meeting of capital city mayors and governors. And he sent all three of his
children to Singapore for schooling.
Yet this background is not
reflected in their approaches to foreign policy.
Jokowi’s Vision and Mission
statement has an extensive consideration of foreign and security policy.
The over-arching objective he
would follow in foreign policy, Jokowi argued, was to strengthen the authority
of Indonesian foreign policy and re-position Indonesia on global issues.
Emphasis was to be placed on maritime
issues, on Indonesia’s geo-strategic position as an archipelagic state, at a
major chokepoint of world commerce between the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
including consolidation of the nation’s maritime boundaries and protection of
the resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone. In a veiled reference to the conflict
in the South China Sea, Jokowi said he would: “reduce maritime rivalries
between the major powers and push for the resolution of territorial claims in
the region.” And he foresaw greater regional maritime cooperation, especially
through the Indian Ocean Rim Association.
The centrality of ASEAN in
Indonesian foreign policy, though, was to be retained.
Stress was also laid on
Indonesia’s international role as a democratic country with a moderate Muslim
majority, echoing one of the themes of Indonesian foreign policy much supported
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) since Hassan Wirajuda’s time as
Foreign Minister.
At the same time, Indonesia would
increase its global role as a middle power -- not a term normally used in
Indonesian foreign policy discourse -- working in particular through
multilateral institutions including the UN, OIC and G20 and for reform of the
World Bank and the IMF.
And in terms of national security,
Jokowi called for an increase in Indonesia’s defence budget to 1.5% of GDP
within five years and for support for the domestic defence industry so as to
reduce dependence on foreign military suppliers.
This is an outward looking set of
proposals. It is multilateralist; it recognises Indonesia’s special
characteristics as a maritime nation, and its geostrategic location. It does
not particularly exaggerate Indonesia’s regional and global influence, but nor
does it play it down either. But it says nothing about major bilateral
relations, such as with China, Japan and the United States. Nor does it make
much of an effort to link international and domestic affairs.
If we look at Prabowo’s statement,
the striking thing is how little is said about foreign or security policies.
Unlike the Jokowi statement, there is no clear articulation of a set of ideas
about foreign policy. The bulk of the statement is about domestic affairs –
which is probably a sensible move, given that elections anywhere are rarely won
on foreign policy issues.
Most of the
internationally-related material is an extension of the discussion of domestic
matters, especially the economy. Thus there is a pledge to reduce new
government overseas borrowings, with the target of zero in 2019, and to make Indonesia
a world centre for the development of Islamic banking and Muslim creative
industries. National competitiveness facing the introduction of the AEC at the
end of 2015 is to be raised.
Perhaps the most assertive
element was that Prabowo would:
... continue
the re-negotiation of mining and oil and gas contract which are not sufficiently
fair and in the case of contracts which have expired to give priority to
national businesses, in combination with agencies under the authority of the
central government.
In the field of national
security, ritual reference was made to strengthening the Armed Forces and the
Police to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state.
For the candidate reputed to be
most experienced in international affairs, this statement provides thin
pickings. There is no clear set of ideas or principles governing foreign
relations set out here, nor anything substantial on security policy. Even the
discussion of foreign presence in the economy was relatively muted. This is the
more surprising perhaps given Prabowo’s military and business background, and
his substantial international experience. But as noted earlier, foreign policy
issues rarely arouse much domestic political interest: perhaps Prabowo was
simply being a smart politician in directing his attention to domestic matters.
Now to the third presidential
debate on 22 June 2014, focussing on international relations and national
security.
Like the preceding ones, this
debate was grand theatre – audience participation was obviously a primary theme
– but limited in what it told us about the policies of the two candidates.
Though hesitantly and not always
convincingly, Jokowi presented the more nuanced view of what constitutes
contemporary international relations.
True, he started out very
conventionally. Indonesia’s foreign policy under a Jokowi presidency, he
assured his audience, would be based on the traditional principle of bebas aktif – whatever that means. He
noted four foreign policy priorities he would follow: the protection of
Indonesian workers abroad; the protection of national maritime resources and
trade; the development of Indonesia’s international competitiveness; and
regional and global security. The stress on maritime issues, reflecting perhaps
the heightened regional tensions around China’s activities in the South China
Sea and reflecting his Visi Misi
statement might have been new, but these are generally well-trodden paths.
But he also talked about soft
diplomacy. He identified cultural diplomacy and educational diplomacy, for
instance, as being areas which needed to be paid much greater attention in the
future.
He also stressed trade diplomacy.
Reflecting perhaps his own business background, and keen to appeal to
Indonesian – and perhaps also foreign – business interests, he said that all
Indonesia’s ASEAN Ambassadors ought to be ambassadors for trade, marketing
Indonesia’s products to the countries to which they were accredited. Quite what
the Trade Attaches currently in these embassies thought of this idea is
unknown.
Prabowo’s scope was more limited.
He noted at the outset – fairly conventionally – that foreign policy reflects
domestic conditions. He developed this into what was the dominant theme of his presentation:
that Indonesia will only be respected internationally, and only be able to
influence others, if it is strong domestically. One of Indonesia’s economic
weaknesses, he argued, was that foreign interests controlled too much of the
country’s natural resources.
Using – or affecting – a
Suhartoesque accent, which translated every “kan” suffix into “ken”, he ended
his initial presentation by saying that he would defend Indonesia to the last
drop of his blood.
In the question and answer
section of the debate, Jokowi was surprisingly weak on ASEAN. Prabowo asked him
what he would do about the issue which has most worried, and most divided,
ASEAN recently: the territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.
Jokowi responded by saying that this was a dispute which did not directly
involve Indonesia. To my knowledge, he said, we are not directly involved in
the South China Sea conflict, which it was a problem for “other countries”.
Moreover, if Indonesia was dragged in to it, there was a danger that it would harm
its relations with China – which he referred to as Tiongkok. If we are
confident our diplomatic efforts would help resolve the problem, he said, then
of course we should act. But if we are not confident this would be the outcome,
then why should we get involved?
Prabowo’s position was much
stronger. He said that part of Indonesia’s sovereign
territory was in fact claimed by another country, a clear reference to seas around
the Natuna islands. Here he was echoing the position which had
been put forcefully earlier in the year by TNI commander
General Moeldoko, who had argued that the TNI currently saw greater potential for conflict in the
Natuna Islands than in the Ambalat region off the coast of North Kalimantan.
Prabowo, moreover, stressed Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN on the issue. We
are part of ASEAN, he said. Should we, as the biggest member of ASEAN, take no
position on the issue? Or should we defend our four ASEAN friends, who are
embroiled in the territorial disputes?
The
only other mention of ASEAN in the debate was Jokowi’s raising of the issue of
the ASEAN Economic Community, due to come into effect at the end of 2015. For
the most part, both candidates dealt with the issue in an anodyne way. But both
also revealed their inherent protectionist tendencies, stressing that the AEC
should not be allowed to flood the Indonesian marketplace with imported goods.
We should be ready to attack their markets before they attack ours, said
Jokowi.
Australia
was raised as an issue by Jokowi, who asked Prabowo what was wrong with the
Indonesia-Australia relationship, which made it rise and fall so readily.
Nothing really, was the response, except perhaps that Australians had a
suspicion, possibly even a phobia, about Indonesia. In this, of course –
assuming he was speaking primarily about the Australian population rather than
the Australian government -- he was correct. His solution? We need to show
Australia that we want to be good neighbours. But also to show them that we are
not weak – countering the impression which might otherwise have been given.
Jokowi
agreed that there were no major problems in the relationship that an
improvement in trust would not fix – Australia’s trust of Indonesia, of course.
Here his response was a bit more imaginative than Prabowo’s. The absence of
trust could be overcome through his three-pronged G2G, B2B and
P2P diplomacy. Further, he argued for the importance of cultural and
educational diplomacy here as well, something which will go down well in Julie
Bishop’s eyes, as the Minister most clearly identified with the New Colombo
Plan. But underlying it all was the assertion that Australia had to be careful
not to belittle Indonesia, or underplay its significance.
Interestingly, both candidates
avoided the patent dog-whistling by the debate moderator, Hikmahanto Juwana –
well-known for his vigorous views on the Indonesian relationship with
Australia. In his opening question, he asked the candidates what they would do
about border disputes, overlapping territorial claims and asylum-seekers.
Neither candidate responded to the third issue. Elsewhere, though, Hikmahanto
is quoted as saying that Prabowo had a much better handle on the relationship
with Australia than Jokowi: meaning he took a much tougher line.
The debate was also interesting
for what was not covered. Thus there was nothing on Indonesia’s relations with
the United States or Japan, and the barest of mentions of China – and just in
the South China Sea context. There was one brief mention by Jokowi of
Palestine, in which he pledged support for Palestinian independence and full
membership of the UN, but apart from that nothing on the Middle East. And not a
mention – my Brisbane colleagues will lament – of the G20.
What would be implications of a
win by either candidate?
It is likely that Kemlu would
prefer Jokowi as President. For one thing, a President Jokowi would be less
likely to try to impose his will on the Ministry, both because he is not primarily
interested in foreign affairs, and because such is not his leadership style. He
would be likely to continue the practice of appointing a Kemlu diplomat as
Minister, pleasing the men at the Ministry with their predilection for one of
their own as Minister.
More than that, though, many in
Kemlu – people who supported the reforms Hassan Wirajuda brought about – are
sympathetic to the kinds of values Jokowi presents, seeing them as being
congruent with Kemlu’s recent position of promoting democratisation as a key element
in Indonesian foreign policy, and promoting the country as an example of how
Islam and democracy are compatible. One senior Kemlu diplomat said to me
recently:
... till
now, relations between Jokowi and Kemlu have been very close. From when he was
still in Solo, Kemlu was always “selling” overseas his successes in handling
the issues of street traders, urban development and city management.
Kemlu would find a President
Prabowo more difficult to deal with. He would be more likely to want to
intervene directly in the work of the Ministry, and possibly even to place his
foreign policy advisor, Bara Hasibuan – a PAN activist – into the Minister’s
position. And clearly Prabowo’s reputation would make it difficult for Kemlu to
continue to pursue the democratisation agenda, the more so if some of the more
radical Islamist elements in his coalition were to exert real power.
In ASEAN, political sympathies
would be more likely to favour Prabowo. For one thing, he would be unlikely to
continue the democratisation theme in foreign policy, to the quiet relief of at
least some ASEAN members who have grown a little tired of this line, and its
implied criticism of their own political systems. Prabowo’s leadership style
would be likely to win him support too: in his August 2012 speech at RSIS, he
identified Lee Kwan Yew and his PAP as models for his own political leadership,
and for his party Gerindra.
Jokowi, as noted earlier, did
reaffirm the centrality of ASEAN in Indonesian foreign policy, but this is
hardly a controversial position. However he was weak on protecting ASEAN unity
in the South China Sea conflict. Prabowo was much stronger on this issue.
China
would presumably on principle be more comfortable with a President displaying
Prabowo’s leadership style. But a President Prabowo would present China with
considerable problems. There is his position on the South China Sea, already
noted. And his role in the rapes and murders of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in
Jakarta in 1998 presumably remains alive in the memories of many in Beijing.
Jokowi’s position on the South China Sea would be more acceptable to China, but
his strong position on maritime matters generally in the region would sound
warning bells. Either way, China is likely to find more problems in dealing
with Indonesia under its next President than its current one.
Australia
too, I suspect, would find either candidate more difficult to work with than
SBY, if we are to go by their published comments and the foreign affairs
debate.
Jokowi would probably be the
better of the two for Canberra in political terms. His support for the
democratisation process would be favourably regarded, and seen as congruent
with Australia’s own interests. And he does not have much so much negative
political baggage to carry as Prabowo.
But conversely, he may feel the
need to act more firmly with Australia on some issues simply to show that he is
looking after Indonesia’s interests (more clearly, perhaps, than SBY is seen to
have done) and to keep faith with the political direction favoured by many in
the PDIP leadership. Asylum-seekers could be one, the Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement another. He would not be likely to explicitly attack
SBY’s policies, at least not so long as he hoped to receive the support of
Demokrat members of parliament. But maintaining good relations with Australia
will not be a priority.
And Jokowi’s political style
might be difficult to handle too. Pinning him down what he means on specific
issues of domestic policy is hard enough: on foreign policy, it is likely to be
harder. Much will depend on his choice of Foreign Minister.
At another level, a President
Prabowo might be easier to deal with. As Hamish McDonald wrote recently:
Among
Westerners who’ve met them both, Prabowo is someone who “thinks like us” and
talks like a Westerner, thanks to his education in Singapore, Britain and other
places during his economist father’s exile between 1958 and 1965 for joining a
failed rebellion.
But of course Prabowo’s baggage
is much heavier. At a pragmatic level, any state visit to Australia by a
President Prabowo to attend trhe G20 summit in Brisbane in November, for
instance -- would be met with extensive opposition, including demonstrations. This
would elicit critical responses in Indonesia, counter-demonstrations and so
forth. Not likely to improve trust, and hardly in Canberra’s interests.
Further, despite his restrained performance in the debate and in several other
public platforms, Prabowo is obviously perfectly prepared to play the strong
nationalist – even xenophobia -- card when he judges the occasion warrants, for
political or economic purposes. His now
infamous speech in Medan on 11 June 2014 is an excellent example.
However neither President would
be able to give free rein to his ideas in office. Indonesian presidents do not
today enjoy the freedom to determine national policy unilaterally in the way
that Suharto did, on occasions at least. The parliament, Kemlu, the media and
civil society organisations all have an influence in these matters. This will
be all the more the case if, as seems likely, the winning margin is very
narrow.
Ernest Bower said recently:
For the United
States, it is most important to focus on the mandate of the Indonesian people.
Washington must embrace and work with whichever candidate is elected.
The same thing goes for Australia.
Colin Brown is adjunct Professor for the Griffith Asia Institute.
No comments:
Post a Comment